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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE-SACRIFICIAL
RITES BECOME CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ON THE ALTAR OF BABALU
AYE.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution states that "Congress shall make no law ...
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]. . . ."I Although this passage
appears to clarify the Constitutional requirements with respect to
religious freedom, it has not prevented the government from bur-
dening religiously motivated conduct. Since its inception, the Free
Exercise Clause has undergone various interpretations and applica-
tions by the courts and the government. This variation has called
into question the protection the Free Exercise Clause provides a
person whose religious freedom has been burdened by a governmental
action. Most such governmental action has taken the form of neutral
and generally applicable laws which by their operation have placed
a substantial buifden on certain religious activity. 2 Rarely have laws
purposely placed a special burden upon particular religious conduct.
3
Facially neutral laws of general applicability that only inciden-
tally burden religious conduct have historically been upheld by the
courts even though these laws undermined the religious freedom of
particular groups.4 Not until 1963, when the Supreme Court first
implemented the "compelling interest" test, did the Free Exercise
Clause provide substantive protection from governmental interference
with religious exercise.5 For almost three decades, and with minimum
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), members of the
Amish religion challenged a state compulsory school attendance law, which was a
neutral and generally applicable law, because it burdened their religion by requiring
Amish children to attend high school when their religion required them to be at
home learning the Amish way of life.
3. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S.
Ct. 2217 (1993) (holding invalid a city ordinance that prohibited killing animals in
religious rituals, but allowed the killing of animals in almost all other circumstances).
4. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding a state
regulation prohibiting the selling of merchandise in public by minors as applied
to a child who was distributing religious literature); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis,
310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upholding a state regulation that required students to salute
the flag even though this practice was contrary to a particular student's religious
beliefs); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (upholding a state prohibition
on polygamy as applied to a Mormon who claimed polygamy was an integral part
of his religious exercise).
5. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Under the balancing test applied
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exceptions, the Supreme Court applied the compelling interest test
to free exercise cases.
6
In 1990, however, free exercise jurisprudence underwent a sudden
and unexpected change when the Supreme Court abandoned the
compelling interest test and held that neutral and generally applicable
laws will be upheld regardless of the burden placed upon religion.'
As a result of this decision by the Court, the future of Free Exercise
Clause protection looked questionable. However, in 1993, the United
States Congress and President Clinton restored the protection the
Free Exercise Clause had once provided religious observers when
they enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,8 which in effect
reinstated the compelling interest test to all free exercise claims. 9 As
a result of this Act and the Court's holding in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,0 any law that burdens religious
conduct whether neutral or directly discriminatory, must undergo
strict scrutiny before it can be held constitutionally valid. Today,
religious freedom in the United States has once again attained the
constitutional protection it so appropriately relished in the past.
II. FACTS
The Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. ("the Church")
is a non-profit organization incorporated under Florida law in 1973."
The Church practices the Santeria religion, which was brought to
in Sherbert, the claimant had to show that the challenged law imposed a substantial
burden on the free exercise of his religion; thereafter, the burden shifted, and the
state had to prove that the burden was justified by some compelling state interest.
Id. at 403-09.
6. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (applying the com-
pelling interest test to uphold the denial of a charitable deduction for payments
-made to the Church of Scientology for "training services"); Frazee v. Illinois Dep't
of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (applying
the compelling interest test to uphold the denial of an exemption to the payment
of social security taxes); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707 (1981) (applying the compelling interest test to grant an exemption
to the conditions for unemployment compensation); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972) (applying the compelling interest test to create an exemption to a
compulsory school attendance law); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)
(applying the compelling interest test to uphold the denial of an exemption to the
Military Service Act).
7. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
8. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993)).. 9. The primary purpose of the Act was to restore the compelling interest test.
Id.
10. 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993). The Court in Babalu Aye held that laws that are
not neutral but directly discriminatory must undergo the compelling interest test.
11. Id. at 2223.
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the United States by exiles from the Cuban Revolution. 2 It teaches
that every individual has a destiny from God that is fulfilled with
the aid and energy of the Santeria spirits known as the orishas.3
The Santeria religion is based upon a personal relationship with the
orishas, and animal sacrifice is one of the principal forms of ex-
pressing devotion to these spirits.' 4 According to Santeria teaching,
the orishas depend upon this sacrifice for survival. 5
Sacrifices are performed at the time of birth, marriage, death,
at the initiation of new members and priests, during annual cele-
brations, and to cure the sick.' 6 Sacrificial animals include chickens,
doves, pigeons, ducks, goats, guinea pigs, sheep, and turtles. 7 Only
trained priests can perform the animal sacrifice.'" The priests kill
12. Id. Santeria adherents in Cuba faced widespread persecution. Id. at 2222-
23. As a result, they practiced their religion and its rituals in secret. Id. Even
today, the open practice of the Santeria religion remains infrequent in the United
States and Cuba. Id. at 2223. However, there are presently an estimated 50,000
practioners of the Santeria faith in south Florida. Id. Because Santeria remains an
underground religion, most religious activity takes place by extended family groups
in individual homes. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
723 F. Supp. 1467, 1470 (S.D. Fla. 1989). There is little intermingling between
these groups, and few practitioners know adherents outside their own group. Id.
Fear of discrimination by outsiders is the principal reason why the adherents practice
the religion secretly. Id. Ernest Pichardo, the Church's priest, believes that if the
Church were permitted to practice its rituals openly, the religion would become
more open and accepted. Id.
13. Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2222. The Santeria religion originated when
hundreds of thousands of the Yoruba people were brought as slaves from eastern
Africa to Cuba. Id. While in Cuba, the Yoruba's native religion of Santeria was
forbidden, and they were expected to become Christians. Babalu Aye, 723 F. Supp.
at 1469. To escape harsh penalties, discrimination, and social stigma, they began
to express their faith through the use of Catholic saints and symbolism, and, as
a result, their traditional African religion absorbed significant elements of Roman
Catholicism. Id. at 1469-70. By blending the two religions, the Yoruba were able
to practice Santeria while appearing to practice Catholicism. Id. at 1470. The
resulting fusion was the Santeria, "the way of the saints." Babalu Aye, 113 S.
Ct. at 2222.
14. Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2222.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. Most of the animals are bought either from botanicas, stores specializing
in selling religious articles, or from local farms that breed animals specifically for
sacrifice. Babalu Aye, 723 F. Supp. at 1474.
18. Babalu Aye, 723 F. Supp. at 1471. The ritual surrounding the killing of
the animal is learned through an apprenticeship. Id. at 1472. The apprentice observes
an experienced priest and learns where and how the knife should be inserted. Id.
In time, the apprentice becomes familiar with the technique and participates in the
sacrifice by holding the knife as the priest guides the apprentice through the killing
stroke several times. Id. When the priest is satisfied that the apprentice is fully




the animals by cutting the carotid arteries located in the animals'
necks.' 9 Thereafter, the sacrificed animal is usually cooked and eaten;
however, if the sacrifice is performed during a healing or death
ritual, the animal is not consumed.20
In April of 1987, the Church leased land in the city of Hialeah,
Florida and subsequently announced its plans to establish a house
of worship as well as a cultural center, school, and museum .2 Ernesto
Pichardo, the Church's priest, also announced the Church's goal to
bring the practice of the Santeria faith into the open, including its
ritual of animal sacrifice.
22
This announcement of the Church's plans prompted the Hialeah
City Council to hold an emergency public session on June 9, 1987.23
At this meeting and a subsequent meeting, the city council passed
several overlapping ordinances and resolutions that were specifically
devised to prohibit animal sacrifice practiced only by the Santeria
adherents.2 4 All ordinances and resolutions passed the city council
by unanimous vote.
25
Subsequent to the enactment of the ordinances, the Church and
Pichardo filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. 26 The
19. Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2222. The priest places the sacrificial animal on
its left side on a table while the apprentice holds the animal's legs. Babalu Aye,
723 F. Supp. at 1472. The priest stands on the other side of the animal and with
his left hand holds the animal's head, which is facing away from the priest, high
in the air. Id. At the same time, the priest holds a four-inch knife in his right
hand. Id. Within moments after the animal is placed on the table, the priest
punctures its neck with the knife, which is thereafter pushed all the way through
the neck. Id. This knife does not actually cut the throat of the animal because
the knife goes directly into the vein area that is just behind the throat and in
front of the vertebrae. Id. Ideally, this severs both of the main arteries in the
neck, and the animal dies within seconds. Id.
After the animal is killed, its bloo,. is dr-aned into clay pots that are placed
directly below the animal's head. Id. at 1473. The animal is then decapitated, and
its head is removed from the area. Id. After the blood is placed before the deities,
it is supposedly removed and disposed of along with the carcass of the animal,
although it is not known what is actually done with either. Id. There was, however,
credible testimony at trial that at times the blood is actually drunk, poured on
individuals, or left for long periods of time in the clay pots, although Pichardo
testified that those would be deviant practices. Id. at 1473 n.21.
20. Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2222. On such occasions, the sickness is believed
to have passed into the animal, and the animal is not eaten. Babalu Aye, 723 F.
Supp. at 1474.
21. Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2223.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2223-24; see infra note 208 and accompanying text.




Church named as defendants the city of Hialeah, its mayor, and
its city council members in their individual capacities. 27 The plaintiffs
alleged violations of their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment and prayed for injunctive and monetary relief
as well as for a declaratory judgment. 8 The district court granted
summary judgment for the individual defendants because they had
absolute immunity for acts performed in their legislative capacities. 29
The district court further held, contrary to the plaintiffs' allegations,
that the ordinances and resolutions adopted by the city council did
not amount to an official policy of harassment.3 0
After a nine-day bench trial, the district court ruled in favor
of the city, holding that there was no violation of the plaintiffs'
rights under the Free Exercise Clause. 3' The district court acknowl-
edged that the ordinances were not religiously neutral.3 2 The court
further recognized that the concern expressed by the city with respect
to animal sacrifices was "prompted" by the Church's announcement
to bring its religion and accompanying rituals into the open.33 How-
ever, the court concluded that the purpose of the ordinances was
not to directly discriminate against the Church, but rather to end
the practice of animal sacrifice within the city regardless of the
identity of the practitioners.3 4 The district court noted that specifically
regulating religious conduct that is inconsistent with the public health
and welfare does not violate the First Amendment. 35 The district
court concluded that the compelling governmental interests in pro-
tecting the health and safety of the public, in preventing emotional
injury to children witnessing such killings, in protecting animals from
cruel and unnecessary killing, and in restricting the slaughter or
sacrifice of animals to areas specifically zoned for slaughterhouse
use fully justified the burden on the plaintiffs' religious conduct.3 6
The court further stated that a religious exemption from the or-
dinances would defeat the city's compelling interests and would be




30. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' "discouragement, harassment,
threats, punishment, detention, and threats of prosecution" violated the plaintiffs'
constitutional rights. See Babalu Aye, 723 F. Supp. at 1469.
31. Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2224.
32. Babalu Aye, 723 F. Supp. at 1476.
33. Id. at 1479.
34. Id. at 1479, 1483.
35. Id. at 1484.
36. Id. at 1485-86.
1994]
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members in the municipality. 7 Moreover, the court determined that
such an exemption would have to extend to all religions, which in
effect would swallow the rule.
38
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
(Eleventh Circuit) affirmed the district court's decision in a one-
paragraph per curiam opinion.3 9 Choosing not to rely on the district
court's compelling interest test, the Eleventh Circuit simply stated
that the challenged ordinances were consistent with the Constitution.
4
0
The Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs' petition for writ of cer-
tiorari.4 ' The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the non-neutral
ordinances were unconstitutional as violative of the Free Exercise
Clause because they were not justified by a compelling governmental
interest. 42 Furthermore, the Court stated that the discriminatory laws
could not be upheld even if there was some compelling state interest
because the ordinances were not narrowly tailored to meet such
interests .43
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
A. General Intent of the Framers
Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, there were attempts
made throughout the colonies and the states to regulate religion.
44
Historical episodes of religious persecution and intolerance concerned
the drafters of the Free Exercise Clause. 45 The intent of the framers
in drafting the Free Exercise Clause was to separate church and
37. Id. at 1487.
38. Id.
39. Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2225; Church of Lukumi v. City of Hialeah,
936 F.2d 586 (lth Cir. 1991).
40. Church of Lukumi, 936 F.2d at 586.
41. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 112 S. Ct.
1472 (1992).
42. Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2226.
43. Id. at 2218.
44. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878). The government taxed
the people against their will for the support of religion, regardless of whether they
subscribed to the tenets and beliefs of the particular religion they were forced to
support. Id. In addition, people were punished for failing to attend public worship
services or for expressing heretical opinions. Id. at 162-63.
45. Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2226; See also Developments in the Law-Religion
and the State, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1606, 1704 n.2 (1987) [hereinafter Developments].
[Vol. 16:623
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state6 and thereby prevent the government from interfering with
individual values of religion and conscience. 47 The Court has recognized
that the framers of the Constitution were conscious of the varied
and sometimes extreme views of numerous religious sects and of
the disagreement among them.48 Furthermore, the Court has noted
that when the framers fashioned a charter of government, they
envisioned the broadest possible tolerations of conflicting views.
49
The framers realized that the right to freely exercise one's religion
is a necessary element to a stable society.50 The state would lose its
claim of legitimacy, as well as the moral underpinnings of the law,
if it compelled an individual to choose between his religion and
fundamental property or liberty interests. 5 Therefore, free religious
exercise was incorporated into the Constitution in an attempt to
separate the individual's right to freely exercise his religion and the
government's inherent right to rule.
B. Substance and Interpretation
. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides that
Congress shall make no law "prohibiting the free exercise" of
religion.5 2 The Free Exercise Clause was applied to the states by
46. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163-64. After the adoption of the First Amendment,
Thomas Jefferson stated:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man
and his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his
worship; that the legislative powers of the government reach actions only,
and not opinions,-I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the
whole American people which declared that their legislature should 'make
no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the Free
Exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and
State.
8 Works of Thomas Jefferson 113.
47. See Sharon W. Murphy, Note, Free Exercise of Religion: A Luxury Our
Nation Can No Longer Afford?-Employment Division v. Smith, 16 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 435, 441 (1991).
48. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (explaining that the Free
Exercise Clause was created in order to ensure that even the most incomprehensible
religious views would receive full constitutional protection).
49. See id.
50. See Developments, supra note 45, at 1704. "The free exercise clause of the
first amendment may simply reflect the framers' recognition of the political truth
that to deny religious freedom is to encourage outright revolt." Developments,
supra note 45, at 1704.
51. Developments, supra note 45, at 1703.
52. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
19941
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incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 First and foremost,
the Court has stated that free religious exercise includes the right
to believe and profess whatever religious doctrines that one desires.
5 4
The Court has held that when the government attempts to regulate
religious belief, the protections afforded by the First Amendment
are absolute." The Court has further held that the government cannot
require affirmation of religious belief,5 6 utilize its taxing power to
restrict the dissemination of particular religious views,5 7 impose special
disqualifications on the basis of religious belief,5" or punish the
expression of religious doctrines that it believes to be false.59 However,
the Court has recognized that the "exercise" of religion usually
involves not only the profession of one's beliefs, but also the
performance of certain physical acts. 60 This physical conduct can
take the form of assembling for worship service or participating in
the sacramental use of bread and wine.61 It is when the state, through
53. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (holding that the fun-
damental concept of liberty embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the
liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment).
54. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (explaining that religious
belief may not to any extent be regulated by the state).
55. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) (explaining that the Free
Exercise Clause door remains tightly closed to any governmental regulation of
religious beliefs); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) (explaining that
the freedom to express religious opinions and beliefs is absolute); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1939) (explaining that freedom of religion includes
the absolute right to one's own religious beliefs); Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (explaining that governmental actions and laws may not
interfere with religious belief),
56. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (holding that a state requirement
to declare one's belief in God as a condition to holding public office violated the
Free Exercise Clause).
57. Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (holding invalid under the First
Amendment a municipal ordinance which imposed a license tax on book agents
as it was applied to a minister); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)
(holding invalid under the First Amendment a municipal ordinance that required
persons to pay a license tax as a condition to solicit or distribute religious materials).
58. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (holding that a state statute
prohibiting members of the clergy from serving as delegates to the state constitutional
convention violated the Free Exercise Clause); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S.
67 (1953) (holding that a municipal ordinance prohibiting Jehovah's Witnesses, but
not preachers from other denominations, from preaching in a public park violated
the Free Exercise Clause); cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (holding that
a state statute favoring certain denominations over others violated the Establishment
Clause).
59. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (holding that the First
Amendment does not require a determination of the truth or falsity of the professed
religious belief).




its laws, burdens this religiously motivated conduct that the issue
of Free Exercise Clause protection comes into question.
To invoke the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, a person
must hold a sincere religious belief that prevents him from complying
with the law, 62 since only those beliefs that are rooted in religion
warrant protection. 63 Views that are purely secular in nature do not
suffice. 64 However, the Court has made it clear that religious beliefs
need not be acceptable, comprehensible, or logical to others in order
to merit First Amendment protection. 65 Although the Supreme Court
has not attempted to define religion or what constitutes a religious
belief,"6 it has held that a religious belief does not have to be based
on a tenet, belief, or teaching of an established religious sect or
church. 67 It is generally for the trial court to determine if the religious
belief is sincerely held;" however, the sincerity of the belief is usually
not at issue.
Commentators have noted that the majority of free exercise
claims involve requests for exemptions from laws that burden the
religious conduct of a group or individual.6 9 Typically, these challenged
laws are neutral, generally applicable, and constitutional in every
62. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 21.6, at 528-29 (2d ed. 1992).
63. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,
713 (1981) (explaining that the Free Exercise Clause gives special protection to
those beliefs that are religious in nature); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-
16 (1972) (explaining that in order to deserve the protection of the religion clauses
the claim must be connected to religious belief).
64. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16 (explaining that beliefs based on purely secular
considerations may not rise to the demands of the religion clauses); United States
v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 178-79 (1965) (explaining that "a valid conscientious
objector claim . . . must be based solely on 'religious training and belief' and
not on social, political, or philosophical grounds).
65. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714 (holding that the claimant's religious belief against
working in a factory that produced weapons was protected under the Free Exercise
Clause even though it was a personal religious belief and somewhat illogical in
nature).
66. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 62, § 21.6, at 528-29.
67. Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989)
(holding that the claimant's religious beliefs were protected under the Free Exercise
Clause even though those beliefs were not attributable to any particular church or
religious sect).
68. See Frazee, 489 U.S. at 833. "States are clearly entitled to assure themselves
that there is an ample predicate for invoking the Free Exercise Clause. We do not
face problems about sincerity or about the religious nature of Frazee's convictions,
however. The courts below did not question his sincerity, and the State concedes
it." Id.
69. William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free
Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. Rzv. 357, 357-58 (1989-90).
1994]
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respect except for the fact that they incidentally burden certain
religious practices. 70 Such laws raise the issue of whether the
government should be required to grant an exemption from an
otherwise valid regulation to a person whose religious conduct is
burdened by compliance with the law. 7' It has recently been stated
that "[tihe jurisprudence of free exercise . . . is the jurisprudence
of the constitutionally compelled exemption.
'72
C. The Beginning of Free Exercise Jurisprudence: The Belief-
Action Distinction
In 1878, the United States Supreme Court rendered its first
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause in Reynolds v. United
States.73 The Court in Reynolds upheld the conviction of George
Reynolds, a Mormon, for violating a federal anti-polygamy statute,
74
even though the practice of multiple marriages was central to the
Mormon religion.75 The Court distinguished between the freedom to
profess one's religious beliefs and opinions and the freedom to 
engage
in religiously inspired conduct. 76 While acknowledging that the
government could not interfere with religious belief and opinion,
the Court recognized that the government could prohibit and regulate
religiously motivated conduct if such regulation served an otherwise
secular goal.
77
The holding in Reynolds signified the beginning of the belief-
action distinction in free exercise jurisprudence. 78 As a consequence
of that case, as long as the state's regulation of religiously motivated
actions reflected a secular policy, the courts would not grant an
exemption to the law even though it resulted in the burden of an
70. Id.
71. Id. at 358; RoTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 62, § 21.6, at 521.
72. Marshall, supra note 69, at 358.
73. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
74. Id. at 168.
75. Id. at 161. The Mormon Church believed that the male members of the
church had a duty to practice polygamy. Id. The members further believed that
this duty was placed directly upon the male members by God and that failing to
perform that duty was punishable by damnation in the afterlife. Id.
76. Id. at 166.
77. See id. at 166-67. The Court concluded that Reynolds's choice to take more
than one wife could legally be punished without violating the Free Exercise Clause
because the prohibition served the secular policy of alleviating the evil behind
multiple marriages. Id. at 167-68.
78. See Ira C. Lupu, Where the Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the
Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARv. L. Rnv. 933, 938 (1989).
[Vol. 16:623
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individual's religious freedom.79 Reynolds drained the Free Exercise
Clause of its primary constitutional protection because the freedom
to speak was already protected by the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment.80 As a result, as long as state secular policies and
laws remained on the action side of the belief-action dichotomy,
Reynolds would protect such laws from constitutional attack s. 8  In
194082 and 1944,83 the Supreme Court adhered to this belief-action
distinction when deciding the validity of state laws in cases arising
under the Free Exercise Clause.
D. The Hybrid Cases of the 1940's
During the 1940's, a number of laws that restricted certain
religious practices were invalidated by the Supreme Court primarily
because the laws interfered with the First Amendment's free speech
protection. 4 These cases also involved free exercise claims, thereby
earning them the label of "hybrid" cases. 8 However, because another
constitutional right was involved, it was difficult to assess the
independent strength of the Free Exercise Clause's protection.
8 6
The most important of the hybrid cases is Cantwell v.
Connecticut.87 In Cantwell, the Court invalidated a licensing system
for religious and charitable solicitations whereby the Secretary of
Public Welfare had discretion to deny a license if he determined
79. Id. at 938. The Court in Reynolds expressed concern that excusing a man
from a law because it was contrary to his religious belief would make the "professed
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect ...
[would] permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist
only in name under such circumstances." Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167.
80. Lupu, supra note 78, at 938.
81. Lupu, supra note 78, at 938.
82. In Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), the Supreme Court
upheld a state regulation that required students in public schools to salute the flag,
even though this practice was contrary to certain religious beliefs, because the goal
of the statute was secular and therefore the burden on religion was justified.
The Court overruled Minersville in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943), in which the Court invalidated the flag statute on free speech
grounds alone. Id.
83. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), the Court upheld a state
law prohibiting the public sale of merchandise by minors because the secular policy
behind the law justified the burden on the claimant's religion. In that case, the
claimant's child had been distributing religious literature in public.
84. ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 62, § 21.7, at 534.
85. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
86. Philip Spare, Free Exercise of Religion: A New Translation, 96 DICK. L.
REv. 705, 711 (1992).
87. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). "The most important of [the hybrid] cases was Cantwell
v. Connecticut . .. ." ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 62, § 21.7, at 534.
1994]
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that the solicitation was not for a religious cause.88 This determination
was based upon the Secretary's subjective belief of what constituted
a religious message. 89 The Court invalidated the statute on
constitutional grounds because it violated the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. 90
Cantwell is also notable because it represents the first departure
from.the belief-action distinction laid down in Reynolds.9' The Court
was consistent with previous decisions when it recognized that the
First Amendment is comprised of two concepts: freedom to believe
and freedom to act. 92 Freedom of belief is absolute, but in order
to protect society, conduct remains subject to regulation. 93 However,
the Court proceeded to state that any regulation of conduct must
be exercised so as to not "unduly infringe" upon religious conduct.
94
Although the Court primarily based its holding upon free speech
analysis, it did imply that consideration must be given to the extent
which the regulation infringes upon religious conduct. 95
Two additional hybrid cases followed Cantwell: Murdock v.
Pennsylvania96 and Follett v. McCormick.97 In both cases the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional a licensing tax upon distributors of
merchandise on the basis that the tax violated the Free Speech,
Press, and Religion Clauses.98 The Court stated that to levy a tax
against the enjoyment of rights already granted by the United States
Constitution was invalid.99
As of 1960, no Supreme Court case had invalidated a government
regulation solely on the basis that it negatively affected the free
exercise of religion.1m° If the challenged law had a significant secular
goal or policy underlying it, the Court would uphold the law despite
88. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 302-03.
89. id.
90. Id. at 297, 307. "The fundamental law declares the interest of the United
States that the free exercise of religion be not prohibited and that freedom to
communicate information and opinion be not abridged." Id. at 307.
91. See Murphy, supra note 47, at 442.
92. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.
93. Id. at 303-04.
94. Id. at 304.
95. See Murphy, supra note 47, at 443.
96. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
97. 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
98. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 108-10; Follett, 321 U.S. at 575. In both cases the
claimants were Jehovah's Witnesses who had distributed religious literature without
paying the tax.
99. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 113.
100. ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 62, § 21.7, at 536.
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any incidental restrictions on religiously motivated conduct.'01 The
Court would invalidate the law only when the law interfered with
religious belief or opinion or interfered with free speech as well as
free religious exercise. 0 2
E. 1961-The Beginning of the Balancing Era in Free Exercise
Jurisprudence
In Braunfeld v. Brown, 03 the Supreme Court upheld the
application of Sunday closing laws to those persons whose religion
required them to observe a day other than Sunday as the Sabbath.
4
The Court refused to grant the claimants an exemption to the law,
even though this meant they would suffer the economic disadvantage
of closing their businesses two days instead of one. 05 The plurality
in Braunfeld followed the belief-action distinction recognized in
Reynolds.'06 However, Braunfeld appeared to introduce the first
balancing process for evaluating free exercise claims. 1°7 The Court
characterized the effect of the law on the Jewish merchants as an
"indirect" burden. 08 The Court recognized that if the purpose or
effect of a law resulted in discrimination against certain religions,
the law was constitutionally invalid even though the religion was
only indirectly burdened.'09 However, if the purpose of the law was
101. ROTUNDA & NOwAK, supra note 62, § 21.7, at 536.
102. ROTUNDA & NOwAK, supra note 62, § 21.7, at 536.
103. 366 U.S. 599 (1961), reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 869 (1961).
104. Id. at 609. The claimants, a group of merchants who were Orthodox Jews,
were required by their faith to close their places of business from "nightfall each
Friday until nightfall each Saturday." Id. at 601. However, the Sunday closing
laws required them to close on Sundays also, thereby limiting them to five working
days per week while other merchants were open six days a week. Id. at 601-02.
As a result, the claimants argued that the law violated the free exercise of their
religion and that they should be granted an exemption. Id. at 608.
105. Id. at 608. The Court stated that providing such an exemption would
undermine the state's goal of providing one day that was free from the noise and
activity of the commercial world. Id.
106. Id. at 604-05. "[L]egislative power over mere opinion is forbidden but it
may reach people's actions when they are found to be in violation of important
social duties or subversive of good order, even when the actions are demanded by
one's religion." Id. at 603-04.
107. Id. at 605-09. The Court balanced the burdens placed upon the claimants'
religion by the law against society's interest in upholding the law. Id.
108. Id. at 606. The Court characterized the law as an indirect burden because
it did not prohibit the religious practices of the claimants but merely operated to
make the practice of their religion more expensive. Id. at 605. According to the
Court, this indirect burden was markedly different from the burden imposed by
a law forcing an individual to choose between abandoning his religious principles
or complying with the challenged law. Id. at 605-06.
109. Id. at 607.
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to advance a secular goal, the law was valid even if it placed an
indirect burden upon certain religions, unless the state's purpose
could be attained by means not imposing such a burden."10
The Court found that the state had a secular goal in setting
aside one day of "rest, repose, recreation, and tranquility."", In
addition, the Court found that the state would encounter substantial
enforcement difficulty if it permitted the requested exemption."
2
Some commentators have viewed Braunfeld as the starting point for
broadening the scope of free exercise protection for religiously
motivated conduct." 3 This view is based on Braunfeld's recognition
that indirect burdens placed on religious conduct by a state law
could be violative of the Free Exercise Clause."
4
F. 1963-1990: The Sherbert Balancing Test: A New Era in Free
Exercise Jurisprudence
In 1963, two years after Braunfeld was decided, the Court in
Sherbert v. Verner' made a significant departure from the belief-
action distinction that had originated almost a century earlier and,
for the first time in free exercise history, applied a true balancing
test." 6 In Sherbert, an employer fired a Seventh-Day Adventist for
refusing to work on Saturdays because it was contrary to her religion. '
Because she was subsequently denied unemployment compensation
under the state unemployment compensation statute, she sued, claiming
that the statute violated the free exercise of her religion."'
110. Id. (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-05 (1940)).
111. See id. at 607.
112. Id. at 608-09. For example, some people might assert that their religion
compelled them to close their businesses on what had previously been their least
profitable day in order to remain open on Sunday, which would be a more profitable
day. Id. at 609. To allow such exemptions would lead the state down the path of
testing the sincerity of an individual's religious beliefs, a practice which itself might
conflict with the spirit of constitutionally protected religious guarantees. Id. Fur-
thermore, the exempted employers would probably have to hire only those employees
who qualified for the exemption, a practice which would be contrary to a state's
general policy of eliminating religious discrimination in hiring. Id.
113. See Lupu, supra note 78, at 940.
114. See Lupu, supra note 78, at 940.
115. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
116. Id. at 403-09.
117. Id. at 399. Sherbert was a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church,
which teaches that a member should perform no work or labor on Saturday. Id.
at 399 n.l. After she refused to work on Saturday, her employer fired her. Id.
at 399.
118. Id. at 401. Sherbert was denied unemployment compensation because the
Employment Security Commission found that her refusal to work on Saturdays,
636 [Vol. 16:623
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In order to determine the constitutionality of the statute under
the Free Exercise Clause, the Court applied a balancing test.' 9 The
initial burden was placed on the claimant to show that the challenged
law substantially burdened the free exercise of her religion.' 20 If she
succeeded, then the state had to prove that the burden on the
claimant's religion was justified by some compelling state interest.' 2'
Furthermore, even if the state's interest was compelling, the law had
to be the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. 2 2 The
Court found that the challenged statute could not survive this strict
scrutiny, and it therefore granted an exemption from the challenged
law to the claimant.
1 23
The decision in Sherbert breaks all ties with the Reynolds belief-
action dichotomy and secular justification standard. 24 According to
Sherbert, even if a state law has a secular purpose, it can still violate
the Free Exercise Clause if the burden on religion is not justified
by a compelling state interest or if the challenged law is not the
least restrictive means of advancing that interest. 25 This new standard
of review for free exercise cases created the major shift in free
exercise jurisprudence by permitting the Free Exercise Clause to
become a source of judicial protection of religious liberty against
government insensitivity and hostility. 26
even for religious reasons, brought her within the statutory provision that denied
benefits to those workers who failed to "accept suitable work when offered . ..
by the employment office or the employer" without good cause. Id. (quoting S.C.
CODE ANN. § 68-114(3) (Law. Co-op. 1962)).
119. Id. at 403-09.
120. Id. at 403-06.
121. Id. at 406-09. It is not enough to merely show "a rational relationship to
some colorable state interest." Id. at 406. Only the "gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation." Id. (citation omitted).
122. Id. at 407-09.
123. First, the law burdened the claimant's practice of her religion because it
fcrced her to choose between receiving state benefits or following her religious
beliefs. Id. at 404. The Court recognized that the choice imposed on her by the
government "put[] the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as
would a fine imposed against [her] for her Saturday worship." Id.
Second, the state did not prove that it had a compelling or overriding interest.
Id. at 407. The state did argue that an exemption would give rise to fraudulent
claims by people alleging that they quit their jobs for religious reasons when no
such reasons actually existed. Id. However, the Court stated that even assuming
a threat of fraud existed, in order for the law to withstand strict scrutiny the state
was required to demonstrate that no alternative means of regulation would remedy
such abuses without infringing upon First Amendment rights. Id.
124. See Lupu, supra note 78, at 941-42.
125. Lupu, supra note 78, at 941-42.
126. Lupu, supra note 78, at 942.
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G. Cases Applying the Sherbert Balancing Test and Finding the
Burden Unjustified
In 1972, the Court strengthened the protection afforded to
religious freedom by applying the Sherbert test to create an exemption
to a compulsory school attendance law for Amish children whose
parents claimed that the law violated the free exercise of their
religion. 127 The Court balanced the burden placed upon the claimants'
religion 2 1 against the interests of the state in having the law.
12 9
However, the state failed to show how its admittedly strong interest
in compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting
an exemption to the Amish. 30 Therefore, the Court held that the
state compulsory education law could not withstand strict scrutiny
under the Sherbert balancing test.' 3'
127. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
128. The Amish parents claimed, and the Court agreed, that the enforcement
of the compulsory education law which required children to attend school until
the age of sixteen would gravely endanger, if not destroy, the free exercise of their
religious beliefs. The Amish claimants argued that formal high school education
beyond the eighth grade was inconsistent with Amish beliefs. Id. at 211. Because
high school emphasizes competition and pressure to conform, forcing Amish children
to attend high school would place Amish children in an environment hostile to
Amish beliefs. Id. Attending high school also took the children away from the
Amish community during the crucial period of their adolescent lives when they
were expected to learn the roles of Amish farmer or housewife. Id. The claimants
alleged that the compulsory education law threatened the entire religious training
of the Amish children and, therefore, burdened their religion. Id.
129. The state argued that it had an interest in educating children to become
effective and intelligent participants in the American political system. Id. at 221.
However, the record revealed that "the Amish community . . . [was] a highly
successful social unit within ... society, even if [their lifestyle was] apart from
the conventional 'mainstream."' Id. at 222. The state next argued that it had an
interest in the education of children because education prepares individuals to be
self-reliant and self-sufficient, and, if the Amish children chose to leave the com-
munity later on, they would be ill-equipped for life without a high schoor education.
Id. at 221, 224. The Court recognized two flaws in this reasoning: First, there was
no specific "evidence of the loss of Amish adherents by attrition;" second, there
was no evidence "that upon leaving the Amish community the Amish children ...
would [subsequently] become burdens on society because of educational shortcom-
ings." Id. at 224. The state also falsely assumed that Amish parents do not educate
their children after the eighth grade. Id. The state last argued that it had a special
interest in the children's health and well-being, since most Amish children were
workers on family farms. However, the Court recognized that the Amish employment
of children on their farms was not in any way harmful to the children's health
because they were well cared for and well trained. Id. at 229.
130. Id. at 236; see supra note 129.
131. In 1990, in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990), the Court
described Yoder as a decision that was based on both the Free Exercise Clause
and a parent's right to direct the education of his children, which is protected by
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In the 1980's, the Court reaffirmed Sherbert in three additional
unemployment compensation cases.3 2 In all three cases, the Court
granted an exemption to the conditions for unemployment
compensation based upon the Sherbert balancing test.'33 The Court
again found that the denial of unemployment benefits to persons
because of their religious beliefs violated the Free Exercise Clause
and could not withstand strict scrutiny. 34
H. Cases Applying the Sherbert Balancing Test and Finding the
Burden Justified
Except for unemployment compensation cases, the Supreme Court
has not applied the balancing test to invalidate or create exemptions
to neutral, generally applicable laws under an independent free exercise
challenge. Although the Court has applied the balancing test in a
few free exercise cases outside the unemployment compensation field,
the Court has always found the test satisfied.'
The first of those cases was Gillette v. United States. 36 The
claimant in Gillette argued that he should be exempt from the Military
Service Act because his religious beliefs prohibited him from
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, this case could
also be classified as a "hybrid" decision wherein the Court decides a person's
rights under both the Free Exercise Clause and some other constitutional provision.
Thus viewed, Yoder seems to only create a narrow exception from compulsory
attendance laws for "families who can base their claim for an exemption on shared
religious beliefs as well as on a general due process-liberty argument." ROTUNDA
& NOwAK, supra note 62, § 21.8, at 548.
132. Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (applying
the compelling interest test to grant an exemption to the requirements for receiving
unemployment compensation to a claimant who refused to work on Sunday because
of his religious beliefs); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136
(1987) (applying the compelling interest test to grant an exemption to the requirements
for receiving unemployment compensation to a claimant whose religion prevented
her from working on Saturdays); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (applying the compelling interest test to grant an
exemption to the requirements for receiving unemployment compensation to a
claimant who refused to work in a factory department that produced weapons
because it was contrary to his religious beliefs).
133. See cases cited supra note 132.
134. In all three cases, the denial of unemployment benefits put substantial
pressure on the claimants to violate their religious beliefs or be denied unemployment
benefits, thereby causing a burden on their religion. See, e.g., Thomas, 450 U.S.
at 718. Moreover, there was no compelling state interest to justify such a burden.
See, e.g., Frazee, 489 U.S. at 835.
135. That is, the governmental interest justified the burden placed upon religion.
136. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
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participating in the Vietnam war because it was unjust.'"1 The claimant
further argued that failure to allow this particular exemption from
the Act violated the Free Exercise Clause because making him
participate in an unjust war was contrary to his religious beliefs.'
However, the Court applied the balancing test and held that the
incidental burdens felt by persons in the claimant's position were
strictly justified by substantial governmental interests.3 9
In United States v. Lee,"4" the Court again applied the balancing
test but denied an Amish employer of Amish workmen an exemption
from mandatory payment of social security taxes, even though the
payment was forbidden by the Amish faith."4' The Court found that
the burden placed upon the claimant's religion by complying with
the law was justified by a compelling governmental interest and that
any exemption would interfere with the achievement of that interest.
42
In 1989, the Supreme Court applied the Sherbert balancing test
for what apparently was the last time in Hernandez v. Commissioner."
43
The Court held that the action of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue did not violate the Free Exercise Clause when he denied
137. The Act stated that no person would be subject to "service in the armed
forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training or belief, [was]
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." Id. at 441 (emphasis
added). Because the claimant did not object to all wars, but rather just to the
Vietnam war, he did not fit within this exception. Id. at 439.
138. Id. at 461.
139. Id. at 454-63. The government had two compelling interests - to procure
the manpower necessary for defense and to maintain a fair system for determining
who should serve. Id. at 455. As to the latter interest, the Court noted that
conscientious objections are claims of "uncertain dimensions, and that granting
the claim in theory would involve a real danger of erratic or even discriminatory
decisionmaking in administrative practice." Id. The Court noted that there is a
virtually limitless variety of beliefs included under the umbrella statement "objection
to a pa-riular war." I. The Couirt fuirther noted that "over the realm of possible
situations, opposition to a particular war may more likely be political and non-
conscientious" than an objection that has its roots in conscience and religion. Id.
The difficulties of distinguishing the two would be considerable, and there exists
the impossibility of producing fair and consistent results. Id. at 455-56.
140. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
141. Id. at 255, 260-61.
142. Id. at 258-61. The government had an interest in providing and maintaining
a sound tax and social security system. Id. at 258. The Court recognized that it
would be difficult to accommodate this comprehensive system if exemptions were
granted for a wide variety of religious beliefs. Id. at 259-60. It would disrupt the
functioning of the tax system if people were allowed to challenge the payment of
taxes as violative of their religious beliefs. Id. at 260. The Court concluded that
because of the extensive public interest in maintaining a sound tax system, "religious
belief in conflict with the payment of taxes affords no basis for [an exemption]."
Id. at 260.
143. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
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the claimants a charitable deduction for payments they made to the
Church of Scientology as a fixed contribution for certain services.'"
Although the Court had doubts as to whether the burden placed
upon the claimants was substantial, 45 it held that even a substantial
burden would be justified by the "broad public interest in maintaining
a sound tax system."'"4
I. Recent Cases That Abstain From Applying the Sherbert
Balancing Test
There have been four cases in recent years in which the Court
has virtually abandoned the application of strict scrutiny where
freedom of religion is involved. The first case to abandon the Sherbert
balancing test was Goldman v. Weinberger. 47 In Goldman, the Court
held that the Air Force's refusal to allow an Orthodox Jew to wear
his yarmulke'4 while on duty and in uniform did not violate the
Free Exercise Clause. 149 The Air Force regulation at issue prohibited
on-duty and in-uniform personnel from wearing any nonregulation
items of clothing.5 0 Although the claimant argued that the Court
should analyze his case under the Sherbert balancing test, 5 ' the
Court declined to do so and instead based its reasoning on the fact
that the military is a "specialized society separate from civilian
society.' 5 2 Therefore, the courts give more deference to military
regulations than to civilian regulations that are challenged on First
144. Id. at 700. The IRS allows a taxpayer the right to take a deduction from
gross income for contributions that are charitable in nature. I.R.C. § 170 (1994).
However, if the taxpayer receives services in return, the contributions are not
deductible in full. Id. The claimants made a fixed donation to the Church of
Scientology and, in return, were required to take training and auditing sessions.
Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 685. The claimants argued that disallowance of these
donations as deductions violated their right to freely exercise their religion by placing
a heavy burden on the practice of Scientology. Id. at 698.
145. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699. The Scientology faith forbids neither the
payment nor the receipt of taxes. Id. Therefore, any burden imposed as a result
of the denial of the deduction is that the claimants have less money available to
contribute for the church services. Id.
146. Id. at 699 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982)).
147. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
148. A yarmulke is a skullcap worn by Orthodox and Conservative Jewish males
in the synagogue and the home. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1366 (9th
college ed. 1983).
149. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 504.
150. Id.




Amendment grounds.' The Court concluded that the First
Amendment does not dictate that the military must accommodate
religious practices that would detract from the uniformity which the
dress regulations seek to uphold.
15 4
In the same year as Goldman, the Court retreated once again
from the balancing test by holding in Bowen v. Roy'55 that a parent
did not have a free exercise right to prevent the state from using
his child's social security number to identify the child.'5 6 The Court
stated that the Free Exercise Clause simply could not require the
government to conduct its affairs in ways that are consistent with
particular citizens' religious beliefs. 5 7 Furthermore, the Court noted
that the government's use of the child's social security number did
not in any degree restrict the claimant's "freedom to believe, express,
and exercise" his religion.'
In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,5 9 the Court's abstention from
Sherbert continued when the Court applied a reasonableness test in
holding that a prison's refusal to excuse Islamic inmates from work
so that they could attend worship services did not violate the Free
Exercise Clause. '6 In so holding, the Court stated that the prison's
policies 16' were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests
153. Id. at 507. "In the context of the present case, when evaluating whether
military needs justify a particular restriction on religiously motivated conduct, courts
must give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities
concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest." Id.
154. Id. at 509-10. In his dissent, Justice Brennan stated: "The First Amendment
requires that burdens on free exercise rights be justified by independent and important
interests that promote the function of the agency. The only independent military
interest furthered by the visibility standard is uniformity of dress. And, that interest
. does not support a prohibition against yarmulkes." Id. at 522 (citations omitted).
155. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
156. Id. at 712. The child was issued a social security number at birth. The
claimants argued that use of the number to identify the child would violate their
Native American religious beliefs because it would rob the child of her spirit. Id.
at 696. However, the state needed the number to furnish the claimants state benefits.
Id. at 695.
157. Id. at 699. "The Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection from
certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right
to dictate the conduct of the Government's internal procedures." Id. at 700.
158. Id.
159. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
160. Id. at 349-52. To ensure deferential treatment to prison officials, the Court
determined that a less restrictive reasonableness test, rather than the strict scrutiny
standard, should be applied in determining the constitutionality of prison regulations.
Id. at 349. "When a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights,
the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."
Id. (citation omitted).
161. There were two prison policies that prevented the claimants from attending
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in institutional order and security. 162 The Court also based its holding
on the fact that the policies did not deprive the claimants of all
forms of religious exercise, but instead allowed participation in a
number of Muslim ceremonies. 63 Furthermore, there were no
alternatives because any exemptions to the policies would have adverse
effects on the institutional population.' 64
In 1988, the Court did not apply the compelling interest test
to a free exercise claim instituted by a tribe of Native Americans. 165
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,'6 the Court
held that the construction of a paved road through government lands
that were sacred to certain American Indian tribes did not violate
the Free Exercise Clause, despite the fact that the road would impose
a significant burden on the practice of their religion. 67 When the
claimants argued for a strict scrutiny analysis, the Court reasoned
that the strict scrutiny of Sherbert did not and could not imply that
the government must have a compelling interest every time the
implementation of one of its programs makes the practice of certain
religions more difficult. 61 Comparing this case to Bowen v. Roy,
69
the Court concluded that the government could not effectively function
worship services: First, the claimants were required to work outside the buildings
in which they were housed, which was the same building in which the worship
services were held; second, inmates assigned to outside work were prohibited from
returning to those buildings during the day. Id. at 346-47. Thus, the claimants
were prevented from attending worship services during the day. Id. at 347.
162. Id. at 350-51.
163. Id. at 352.
164. Id. at 352-53. Exceptions to the policies would threaten prison security,
would require extra supervision, and would create a perception of favoritism among
the other inmates. Id.
165. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 447, 451. The government did not dispute the claim by the Native
Americans that the building of the road would have devastating effects on their
religious practices. Id. at 451. Those practices were closely connected to the unique
features of the area. Id. The tribe believed that some of the practices in the area
were vitally important in promoting the welfare of the tribe. Id. The Native
Americans used this area to conduct rituals that were aimed at accomplishing their.
religious goals. Id. Those rituals would not have been as effective if performed at
other sites. Id.
168. Id. at 450-51.
169. "The building of a road ... cannot meaningfully be distinguished from
the use of a Social Security number in Roy. In both cases, the challenged government
action would interfere significantly with private persons' ability to pursue spiritual
fulfillment according to their own religious beliefs. In neither case, however, would
the affected individuals be coerced by the Government's action into violating their
religious beliefs; nor would either governmental action penalize religious activity
by denying any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed
by other citizens." Id. at 449.
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if it were required to satisfy the religious needs of all of its citizens.170
As of 1990, the Supreme Court's decisions implicating the Free
Exercise Clause were consistent. For the most part, the Court applied
strict scrutiny when a governmental law burdened a person's religion.
The only time the Court departed from strict scrutiny was if a
government, military, or prison regulation was involved. In the latter
cases, one could argue that the Court did not find a burden, thus
it did not have to apply strict scrutiny. However, in 1990 the Supreme
Court made a radical and unexpected departure from precedential
free exercise cases when it decided Employment Division v. Smith.17'
J. 1990: The End of Sherbert in Free Exercise Jurisprudence:
Smith
In the 1990 case of Employment Division v. Smith,'7 2 the Supreme
Court changed twentieth-century free exercise jurisprudence. The
Court held that under the Free Exercise Clause, a law that burdens
religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental
interest if it is neutral and of general applicability. 73 This holding
destroyed the protection the Free Exercise Clause had once given,
because as long as a law did not specifically target a religion or a
certain religious practice, the law would be upheld regardless of the
burden placed upon religion.
Smith involved two individuals, Alfred Smith and Galen Black,
who were denied unemployment compensation benefits under an
Oregon state law because they had been fired for work-related
misconduct. 74 Smith and Black had been fired from their positions
as drug and alcohol rehabilitation counselors because they had ingested
peyote 75 during a religious ceremony at their Native American
church. 76 Although the possession and use of peyote was banned
by an Oregon state law,' 77 Smith and Black claimed that the Free
170. Id. at 452.
171. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 878-79.
174. Id. at 874.
175. Peyote is a hallucinogenic drug derived from the plant Lophophora williamsii
Lemaire. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. The Oregon drug statute provided:
Oregon law prohibits the knowing or intentional possession of a controlled
substance unless the substance has been prescribed by a medical practioner.
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 475.992(4) (1987). The law defines "controlled substance"
as a drug classified in Schedules I through V of the Federal Controlled
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Exercise Clause protected their use of peyote because it was part
of their religious ceremony.
78
Had the Oregon statute provided an exemption for the sacramental
use of peyote,7 9 the Court could have avoided the free exercise
issue.'10 However, since the statute did not provide such an exemption,
the Court had to determine whether the state's denial of unemployment
compensation to persons who participated in religious conduct that
was criminalized under state law violated the Free Exercise Clause.' 8'
Justice Scalia's majority opinion recognized two basic Free
Exercise Clause principles that have endured throughout the history
of the constitutional provision: First, the government is prohibited
from regulating religious beliefs; 82 and second, the government is
prohibited from regulating actions because of their religious
connotations. 83 If prohibiting or burdening the exercise of religion
is merely the incidental effect of an otherwise neutral and generally
applicable law, the First Amendment has not been violated.'8 The
Court reasoned that to allow an exemption from an otherwise valid
law to a person because his religious beliefs conflict with the law
would "make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to
the law of the land, and in effect . . . [would] permit every citizen
to become a law unto himself."' 85
Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 811-12, as modified by the State Board of
Pharmacy. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 475.005(6) (1987). Persons who violate this
provision by possessing a controlled substance listed on Schedule I are
"guilty of a Class B felony." 475.992(4)(a). As compiled by the State
Board of Pharmacy . .. Schedule I contains the drug peyote....
Id.
178. Id. at 878.
179. ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 62, § 21.8, at 538. A number of states
have provided an exemption to their drug laws for the sacramental use of peyote,
including Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
180. ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 62, § 21.8, at 538. The Supreme Court
had to remand the case to the Oregon Supreme Court for a determination of
whether the use of peyote in connection with a religious ceremony fell within the
prohibition of the Oregon statute. Smith, 494 U.S. at 875-76. On remand, the
Oregon Supreme Court held that religious use of peyote fell within the prohibition
of the statute, because the statute made no exception for sacramental use of the
drug. Id. at 876 (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 763 P.2d 146, 148 (Or. 1988)).
181. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
182. "[Tlhe First Amendment obviously excludes all 'governmental regulation of
religious beliefs as such."' Id. at 877 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
402 (1963).
183. Id. at 877. "It would be true ... (though no case of ours has involved
the point), that a State would be 'prohibiting the free exercise [of religionl' if it
sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious
reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display." Id.
184. Id. at 878.
185. Id. at 879. "Subsequent decisions have consistently held that the right of
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The Court distinguished Smith from previous decisions by stating
that the only cases in which it had held that a neutral, generally
applicable law violated the First Amendment involved not only the
Free Exercise Clause, but the Free Exercise Clause in connection
with some other constitutional protection. 8 6 The Court, in making
this distinction, was referring to the hybrid cases which involved
the rights of freedom of speech and press8 7 or the right of parents
to direct the education of their children. 8 However, the Court
recognized that Smith did not involve such a hybrid situation, but
rather it was a claim based only upon the Free Exercise Clause.8 9
Although the claimants argued that their right to an exemption
should be evaluated under the Sherbert balancing test, the Court
reasoned that it had never used the balancing test to invalidate any
governmental action except the denial of unemployment
compensation. 190 The Court further stated that, although it had
sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test in contexts other
than unemployment compensation, it had always found the test
satisfied.' 9' Moreover, the Court noted that in the years immediately
preceding Smith, it had abstained from applying Sherbert outside
the unemployment compensation field. 92
The Court noted that the Sherbert test was developed in the
unemployment compensation context where an individual who quit
or refused available work could receive unemployment benefits if
he could prove that it was for "good cause."' 93 This good cause
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a
'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes
(or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."' Id. (quoting
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
186. Id. at 881-82.
187. See Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
188. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
189. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. "There being no contention that Oregon's drug
law represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the communication of religious
beliefs, or the raising of one's children in those beliefs, the rule to which we have
adhered ever since Reynolds plainly controls." Id.
190. Id. at 882-83; see Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S.
829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987);
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
191. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883; see Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680
(1989); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437 (1971).
192. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883; see Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987);
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
193. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
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requirement created a system for individualized exemptions. 94
Therefore, the Court concluded that its decisions in the unemployment
compensation cases stand for the proposition that if a state system
creates individual exemptions, the state cannot deny an exception
to cases of religious hardship unless there is a compelling justification
for doing so.191 However, the Court did not completely invalidate
the Sherbert analysis. The Court stated that even if it were tempted
to "breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment
compensation field," it would not apply such a balancing test to
compel exemptions from an otherwise valid criminal law.' 96 The
Court concluded by stating that to make an individual's duty to
comply with a neutral and generally applicable law conditional upon
the law coinciding with his religious beliefs, unless justified by a
compelling state interest, "contradicts both constitutional tradition
and common sense.' ' 97 Accordingly, the Court held that the denial
of unemployment compensation to the claimants for ingesting peyote
in violation of a state criminal statute did not offend the Free
Exercise Clause, even though that action was religiously inspired.
98
In 1993, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Smith when it decided
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.199
Although Babalu Aye did not involve a neutral and generally applicable
law, the Court nevertheless expressed its adherence to the rule that
neutral laws will be upheld regardless of the burden on religion. 200
194. Id.
195. Id. The Court noted that whether the decisions in the unemployment com-
pensation cases were in fact that limited, they in no way addressed conduct that
was prohibited by a criminal statute. Id. The criminality of the statute violated in
Smith is what sets it apart from the other unemployment compensation cases. If
the claimants had not violated a criminal law, then the Court conceivably might
have applied the balancing test.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 885.
198. Id. at 890. Justice O'Connor concurred in the result but stated that the
state should be required to justify any substantial burden on religiously motivated
conduct by showing that it has a compelling state interest and that the law imposing
the burden is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Id. at 898-903 (O'Connor,
J., concurring). However, she agreed with the majority opinion because she found
that the burden placed on the claimants' religion was justified by the state's
compelling interest in preventing drug abuse and related harm. Id. at 903-07
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice Blackmun dissented. Although he agreed with Justice O'Connor's rule,
he reasoned that the state did not have a compelling interest that would justify
the burden on the claimants' religion (because the state offered no evidence showing
that the sacramental use of peyote had ever harmed anyone). Id. at 909-19 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
199. 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
200. Id. at 2226.
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Babalu Aye provided the Court with its first opportunity to review
a law that appeared to fall within an exception to the Smith rule.
20 1
At issue in Babalu Aye were city ordinances that were not neutral
or generally applicable, but directly discriminatory toward Santeria
adherents. 2 2 Instead of holding that such discriminatory laws were
automatically invalid, the Court applied the same compelling interest
test that it had previously applied to neutral and generally applicable
laws in order to determine their constitutionality.23 Therefore, "even
under the Smith doctrine these ordinances deserved strict
scrutiny ... " ,204
IV. THE COURT'S REASONING IN BABALu AYE
The Court began its analysis in Babalu Aye by reaffirming the
rule enunciated in Smith that a neutral and generally applicable law
that incidentally burdens a particular religious practice need not be
justified by a compelling governmental interestA' s The Court rec-
ognized that if a law is not neutral and of general applicability, it
must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and be the
least restrictive means of advancing that interest. 2°6 The Court noted
that general applicability and neutrality are interrelated, and failure
to satisfy one often indicates that the other is also unsatisfied.
20 7
In order to determine if the Church's free exercise rights had
been violated, the Court focused on the content and effect of the
four ordinances and two resolutions that were passed by the city
of Hialeah. 2 8 The Court turned first to the question of neutrality.
201. See J. Brent Walker, Free Exercise of Religion: A Right, Not a Luxury,
6 FLA. B.J., Dec. 1992, at 22, 26.
202. Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2227-33.
203. Id. at 2226.
204. See Walker, supra note 201, at 26.
205. Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2226.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 1. Resolution 87-66 (adopted June 9, 1987) - this enactment noted the city's
concern with religious practices which were contrary to public morals, peace, and
safety, and stressed the city's commitment to prohibit such practices. Id. at 2223.
2. Ordinance 87-40 (adopted June 9, 1987) - this was an emergency ordinance
that incorporated Florida's animal cruelty laws, which punish any person who
cruelly or unnecessarily kills any animal. Id.
3. Resolution 87-90 (adopted August 11, 1987) - this enactment expressed the
city's deep concern with respect to animal sacrifices performed in public and declared
that any person or organization performing such ritualistic sacrifices would be
prosecuted. Id. at 2223-24.
4. Ordinance 87-52 (adopted September 8, 1987) - this ordinance defined the
word "sacrifice" to mean any unnecessary killing, mutilation, or torture of any
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The Court explained that if the purpose of the ordinances was to
prohibit or restrict religious practices because of their religious in-
spiration, they were not neutral. 20 9 The Court further noted that if
the ordinances were not neutral, they were unconstitutional unless
justified by a compelling interest and were narrowly tailored to
advance that interest.
21 0
To determine if the ordinances satisfied the neutrality require-
ment, the Court began with the text, since the minimum requirement
of a neutral law is that it not facially discriminate against the practice
of religion. 21' The Court looked to the words "sacrifice" and "ritual,"
words with strong religious connotations which are used in three of
the ordinances. 12 The Court recognized that, although such words
have a religious origin, they were used in the ordinances for their
secular meaning. 23 Furthermore, the Court noted that the ordinances
defined "sacrifice" in secular terms without any connection to re-
ligious practices. 2 4 However, the Court found that there were other
aspects of the ordinances' text which disclosed that the ordinances
on their face were not neutral. 25 Therefore, the Court concluded
that the ordinances did not pass the requirement of facial neutrality.
21 6
The Court explained, however, that even if the ordinances were
facially neutral, they could still violate the requirement of neutrality
animal in any ritual or ceremony, whether public or private, if food consumption
was not the primary purpose. Id. at 2224. It exempted licensed slaughtering houses
that kill animals that are raised specifically for food. Id.
5. Ordinance 87-71 (adopted September 22, 1987) - this enactment stated that
it would be unlawful for any association, corporation, or person to sacrifice any
animal within the city limits. Id.
6. Ordinance 87-72 (adopted September 22, 1987) - this final enactment defined
"slaughter" as the killing of any animal for food consumption. Id. It prohibited
such slaughter outside those areas specifically zoned for slaughterhouse use but
exempted hogs and cattle that were slaughtered or processed for sale according to
state law. Id.
Any violation of the ordinances was punishable by fines not exceeding $500
or imprisonment not exceeding 60 days, or both. Id.
209. Id. at 2227.
210. Id.
211. Id. "A law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without




215. Resolution 87-66 expressly stated that the city was deeply concerned with
certain religions that engaged in religious practices that were inconsistent with the
peace, safety, and morals of the public. Id. at 2223. The Court noted that it could
not plausibly be suggested that the city officials had another religion besides the




if they targeted religious conduct in their operation. 2 7 The Court
stated that without regard to the text, the effect of a law is strong
evidence of its purpose. 218 When the Court considered the operation
of the ordinances, it became apparent that their main objective was
the suppression of the principal element of the Santeria worship
service. 219 The Court noted that even though the ordinances expressed
concerns unrelated to religious animosity, 220 when the ordinances
were considered as a whole, they disclosed a goal far remote from
the legitimate objectives. 22' The Court pointed out that the ordi-
nances' various definitions, prohibitions, and exemptions demon-
strated that they were carefully "gerrymandered" to exclude almost
all other animal killings except those performed by the Santeria
church members. 222 The Court also recognized that the ordinances
217. Id. at 2227-28. "Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive
treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial
neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility which
is masked, as well as overt." Id. at 2227.
218. Id. at 2228.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 2228. Such legitimate objectives were to alleviate suffering and mis-
treatment of the sacrificed animals and to prevent the health hazards related to
improper disposal. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. Ordinance 87-71 prohibited the sacrifice of any animal but defined
sacrifice as the unnecessary killing of an animal in a ritualistic ceremony in which
food consumption was not the primary purpose of the sacrifice. Id. The Court
recognized that such a definition and prohibition excluded virtually all animal
killings except those performed for a religious reason. Id. Furthermore, the re-
quirement that the killings not be for the primary purpose of food consumption
exempted Kosher slaughter. Id. The Court stated that the end result of this ordinance
was that only Santeria sacrifice was prohibited because it occurred during a ritual
and the primary purpose was to make an offering to the orishas and not for food
consumption. Id.
Similar in effect was Ordinance 87-52, which prohibited the slaughter, sacrifice,
or possession of any animal with the intent to use the animal for food, unless the
possessor was a licensed food establishment where animals was specifically raised
for food. Id. The Court recognized that Santeria adherents alone bore the burden
of this ordinance: The ordinance did not apply if there was no intent to use the
animal for food; or if the animal was to be used for food, then it did not apply
if the sacrifice occurred during a ritual; or if the animal was to be used for food
and the sacrifice occurred during a ritual, then it still did not apply if the sacrifice
was performed by a licensed food establishment and the animals were of a type
raised for food. Id. at 2228-29. "A pattern of exemptions parallels the pattern of
narrow prohibitions. Each contributes to the gerrymander." Id. at 2229.
The Court also looked at Ordinance 87-40, which incorporated Florida's animal
cruelty law and prohibited the unnecessary killing of animals. Id. While religious
killings were deemed unnecessary, killings such as hunting, euthanasia of stray
animals, and eradication of pests and insects were deemed necessary. Id. The
ordinance obviously deemed religious killings to be of less importance than non-
religious killings. Id. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Santeria practice was
being discriminated against because of its religious motivation. Id.
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restricted much more religious conduct than was necessary in order
to achieve the city's interests. 23 The Court reasoned that the legit-
imate governmental interests in preventing animal cruelty and pro-
tecting the public health could be accomplished by restrictions stopping
far short of a strict prohibition on all Santeria sacrifice.
224
In order to determine the object of the ordinances, the Court
also looked to the historical background of the challenged law, the
events leading up to the enactment, as well as the legislative and
administrative history, including statements made by members of
the city council. 225 The Court's insight into the history disclosed that
the ordinances targeted only religiously motivated animal sacrifice
by the Santeria worshippers motivated. 226 In sum, the neutrality
analysis led to only one conclusion for the Court: The ordinances
had as their objective the suppression of the Santeria religion.
227
The Court turned next to the second requirement of the Free
Exercise Clause, that the law burdening religious activity be of general
223. Id.
224. Id. The Court noted that the city's interest in protecting animals could be
achieved by a more narrow regulation. Id. at 2230. Regulation of the treatment
of animals without regard to why the animal is kept is more narrowly related to
the city's interest. Id. Furthermore, if-the city is concerned with animal cruelty,
the focus of the ordinances should be on how the animal is killed and not on
who performs the killing. Id.
Similarly, the Court stated that the city's interest in'protecting the public health
could be accomplished by regulations that did not impose a flat prohibition on
all Santeria sacrifices. Id. at 2229. For instance, if the city is concerned with the
improper disposal of the dead animals, it could regulate the disposal of those
animals. Id. at 2229-30. The city attorney even conceded that Santeria sacrifices
would not be prohibited if they occurred in inspected and licensed slaughterhouses.
Id. at 2230. Therefore, the Court concluded that the ordinances were overbroad
for their stated purposes. Id.
225. Id. at 2230-31.
226. Id, at 2231. The record revealed that the city council had not made any
attempt to address its interests before the Church's announcement. Id. The taped
excerpts and minutes of the June 9, 1987 meeting disclosed a significant hostility
by city residents and city council members toward the Santeria practice of animal
sacrifice and the religion itself. Id. The residents that attended the meeting made
statements that were critical of the Santeria religion, and several persons taunted
Pichardo when he spoke. Id. Furthermore, the president of the city council asked,
"What can we do to prevent the Church from opening?" Id. Similar comments
were made throughout the meeting. Id.
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia agreed with the result reached by the majority,
but he did not agree with the portion of the opinion that considered the subjective
motivation of the lawmakers in constructing the law. Id. at 2239 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). He did not think that the First Amendment permitted the Court to
evaluate whether the Hialeah City Council actually intended to disfavor the Santeria
religion, but rather required the Court to look only'at ihe effect of the law. Id.
at 2239-40.
227. Id. at 2231.
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applicability. 22 The Court noted that this requirement ensures that
in the government's pursuit of legitimate interests, it does not se-
lectively impose special burdens on conduct only because of its
religious motivation. 229 The Court did not have to precisely define
the standard needed in order to determine whether a law is of general
application, since the Court recognized that the ordinances fell far
below the minimum standard necessary to ensure protection of First
Amendment rights. 210 The Court pointed out that each of the or-
dinances only pursued the city's interests against actions inspired by




Because the ordinances were neither neutral nor generally ap-
plicable, the Court turned next to the question of whether the
ordinances advanced interests of the highest order and whether the
ordinances were narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.
2 2
The Court found that the ordinances could not withstand this strict
scrutiny, for even if the city's interests were compelling, 233 the or-
dinances were not tailored in narrow terms to achieve those inter-
ests.234 The Court concluded by stating, "A law that targets religious
228. Id. at 2231-32.
229. Id. at 2232.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 2233. "The underinclusion is substantial, not inconsequential." Id.
at 2232. The Court stated that the ordinances were underinclusive with respect to
the city's interests in protecting the public health and preventing cruelty to animals.
Id. The Court looked to the fact that the ordinances failed to prohibit nonreligious
conduct that undermined these interests as much or to a greater extent than Santeria
sacrifices did. Id. For example, the Court noted that health risks resulting from
improper disposal of animal carcasses are the same whether it is a religious or a
nonreligious killing. Id. at 2233. Similarly, animal killings not prohibited by law,
such as the infliction of pain and suffering in order to promote medical science
or the euthanasia o1 stray or neglected animals, results in the same level of cruelty
as Santeria sacrifices do. Id. at 2232. The Court concluded by stating that the
ordinances appeared to represent a restriction that society is not prepared to impose
upon itself, but only upon the Santeria worshippers. Id. at 2233. "This precise
evil is what the requirement of general applicability is designed to prevent." Id.
232. Id. "A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general
application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny." Id.
233. The city had not demonstrated that its governmental interests were com-
pelling. Id. at 2234. "Where government restricts only conduct protected by the
First Amendment and fails to enact feasible measures to restrict other conduct
producing substantial harm or alleged harm of the same sort, the interest given
in justification of the restriction is not compelling." Id.
234. Id.; see supra note 224 and accompanying text. The stated objectives were
not pursued in regard to similar nonreligious conduct, and such interests could
have been accomplished by narrower regulations that burdened religion to a far
lesser extent. Id. at 2234. The Court concluded that this "absence of narrow
tailoring suffice[d] to establish the invalidity of the ordinances." Id.
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conduct for distinctive treatment or advances legitimate governmental
interests only against conduct with a religious motivation will survive
strict scrutiny only in rare cases.
'235
In his separate concurrence, Justice Souter agreed with the
Court's holding, but he disagreed with the Court's reaffirmance of
the Smith rule because he was doubtful as to whether Smith warranted
adherence. 236 He suggested that Smith was not germane to this case
because it did not involve a neutral and generally applicable law.
23 7
Therefore, he stated that the Court's discussion of Smith was only
dicta, and it was this part of the opinion that he did not join. 238
He stated that this case involved the noncontroversial principle re-
peated by the Smith Court that general applicability and formal
neutrality are necessary conditions for a law to be upheld as not
violative of the Free Exercise Clause. 23 9 He concluded by stating,
"Our cases now present competing answers to the question when
government, while pursuing secular ends, may compel disobedience
to what one believes religion commands. The case before us is rightly
decided without resolving the existing tension, which remains for
another day when it may be squarely faced."' ' 0
V. SIGNIFICANCE
Babalu Aye is significant in that it is one of the rare cases in
which a law had as its main objective the suppression of a certain
religious practice. It is also significant because it reaffirmed the rule
announced in Smith that a law that is neutral and of general
application need not be justified by a compelling governmental
interest regardless of the burden on religion. 24' Although Smith did
not apply in Babalu Aye because the city ordinances at issue were
235. Id. at 2233. In a separate concurrence, Justice Blackmun stated that if a
law has as its object the suppression of some religion, it automatically fails strict
scrutiny. Id. at 2251 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He disagreed with the majority,
which stated that such a law must undergo strict scrutiny and will only be upheld
if it is justified by some compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored
to meet that interest. Id. at 2250-51 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
236. Id. at 2240 (Souter, J., concurring).
237. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
238. Id. at 2242 (Souter, J., concurring).
239. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
240. Id. at 2250 (Souter, J., concurring).
241. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct.
2217, 2226 (1993). "[Our cases establish the general proposition that a law that
is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling
governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a
particular religious practice." Id.
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not neutral or generally applicable, the mere affirmation of Smith
by the Court put the future of the Free Exercise Clause in serious
jeopardy. However, this speculation as to the future of religious
violation claims under the Free Exercise Clause was put to an end
on November 16, 1993, when President Clinton signed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, hereinafter "Act," which in effect over-
ruled Smith.242
The Act was developed in response to the Smith decision and
the uncertainty that decision created with respect to future free
exercise claims.2 43 The Act recognized that Smith essentially eliminated
the requirement of any governmental justification for neutral and
generally applicable laws that burdened religious conduct by virtue
of their operation. 24 Consequently, the Act reinstated the compelling
interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner"5 and Wisconsin v.
Yoder.24 The Act further noted that this is a "workable test for
striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing
prior governmental interests. '"247 In general, the government now
cannot substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, except
when the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest and the law is the least restrictive means of furthering that
interest.248 That is, such laws must undergo strict scrutiny. The Act
guarantees application of the compelling interest test in all cases
where religious freedom is substantially burdened by a neutral and
generally applicable law. 249 A person whose religious exercise has
been burdened in violation of the Act may assert that violation as
a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain the appropriate
relief against the government.
2 0
The Act would not have affected the outcome in Babalu Aye
because the governmental laws at issue were neither neutral nor
generally applicable. However, the Court in Babalu Aye set forth
the same compelling interet test to apply to direttly discriminatory
laws."' This is significant because prior to Babalu Aye, the Court
242. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993).
243. S. REP. No. Ill, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1993).
244. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (Supp. V 1993).
245. See supra notes 115-26 and accompanying text.
246. 42 U.S.C § 2000bb(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993); see supra notes 127-31 and
accompanying text.
247. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (Supp. V 1993).
248. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) to -1(b) (Supp. V 1993).
249. Id.
250. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c) (Supp. V 1993).
251. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct.
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had stated that if a law directly targeted a religious practice for
discriminatory treatment, the law was constitutionally invalid. 252 Now
the Court is stating that such a discriminatory law is subject to the
compelling interest test and is not unconstitutional per se. This, in
effect, means that the government could pass a law that purposely
discriminates against a religious practice that could be upheld if the
government could show that it was narrowly tailored to advance
some compelling interest.
The Act does not specifically address non-neutral, non-generally
applicable laws, but rather states that a burden placed upon a person's
religion that results from a law of "general applicability" will not
be upheld unless it satisfies strict scrutiny. 253 Although Babalu Aye
holds that laws that are not neutral must undergo strict scrutiny in
order to be upheld, it is inconceivable that the Court would ever
uphold a law that directly discriminates against a person's religion
regardless of the compelling state interest or how narrowly designed
it is. However, until Babalu Aye is overruled, either by a subsequent
Supreme Court case or by legislative act, such discriminatory laws
will receive the same treatment as laws that are neutral and of
general application.
Historically, the Court has given prison and military regulations
deferential treatment when challenged under the Free Exercise
Clause. 2 4 Instead of applying the compelling interest test to those
claims, the Court made an exception and applied the rational relation
test. 255 In effect, this lowered the burden of proof placed upon the
governmental body because it only required that the challenged law
2217, 2226 (1993). "A law failing to satisfy [neutrality and general applicability)
must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly
tailored to advance that interest." Id.
252. "It would be true . . . that a State would be 'prohibiting the free exercise
[of religion]' if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are
engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they
display." Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). "[T~he free exercise
clause would invalidate a law that appeared to be religiously neutral on its face,
if it could be shown that the purpose of the ... that passed the law had done so
for the sole purpose of prohibiting or regulating an act because of its religious
significance." ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 62, § 21.8, at 539.
253. S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1993).
254. "Our review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds
is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations
designed for civilian society." Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986).
255. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (holding that the
challenged regulation was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests);
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (holding that the challenged regulation
reasonably regulated dress in the interest of the military's interest in uniformity).
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be reasonably related to legitimate governmental interests. However,
pursuant to the Act, courts must now review free exercise claims
challenging prison and military regulations under the compelling
interest test.2 6 Although some might view this as undermining the
authority and expertise of the prison and military officials, the
Committee on the Judiciary "recognizes that religious liberty claims
in the context of prisons and the military present far different
problems for the operation of those institutions than they do in
civilian settings. Ensuring the safety and orderliness of penological
institutions, as well as maintaining discipline in our armed forces,
have been recognized as governmental interests of the highest or-
der. ''257
Since the courts will now apply strict scrutiny to all laws that
substantially burden a person's religious freedom, the courts will
first have to determine what type of burden is substantial enough
to warrant the application of the compelling interest test. The Com-
mittee on the Judiciary expects the courts to look to free exercise
cases prior to Smith for guidance in determining whether a particular
religious exercise has been substantially burdened.258 Smith alleviated
the need for finding a burden if the law was neutral and generally
applicable because such a law was automatically valid. Now, however,
the courts will essentially have to determine if there is a burden on
a case-by-case basis, the way it did prior to the Smith decision.
Pre-Smith case law makes it clear that only those governmental
actions that place a "substantial burden" on the exercise of religion
must satisfy the compelling interest test. 259 Therefore, the state is
not required to justify every action that might have some incidental
effect on religious exercise. 260 Furthermore, pre-Smith case law also
makes it clear that strict scrutiny is not applicable to those gov-
ernmental actions which only involve the management of internal
govfrnmrllafair or t use of the gvernment's own propertyt
or resources because the resulting religious restrictions do not con-
stitute a substantial burden.2 6' Therefore, the decisions in Bowen v.
Roy262 and Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Association263
remain good law. As long as the courts determine that the challenged
256. H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1993).
257. Id. (emphasis added).
258. S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1993).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 7, 22 n.19.
262. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
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law does not impose a substantial burden on the particular claimant's
religious exercise, the constitutional inquiry is at an end.
The broader implications of applying strict scrutiny to all laws
that burden a person's religious freedom are that the courts will
now spend considerably more time weighing and balancing the com-
pelling governmental interest against the burden on religion. It is
usually not a difficult task for the government to maintain that it
has some type of compelling interest in enacting a law when that
law is challenged on constitutional grounds. Therefore, the legiti-
mation of the challenged law will usually turn upon whether the
law is the least restrictive means of achieving the stated compelling
interest. It is in this context that the difference between a neutral,
generally applicable law and a directly discriminatory law will be
relevant. Courts will be more inclined to hold that a directly dis-
criminatory law, such as the ones in Babalu Aye, is not the least
restrictive means, while neutral and generally applicable laws will
receive more judicial deference.
VI. CONCLUSION
From 1963 until 1990, claims that certain laws violated the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause were given substantive protection
by the courts through application of the compelling interest test.
However, from 1990 until 1993, free exercise protection almost
became nonexistent due to the Court's holding in Employment Di-
vision v. Smith. Although the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
injected some stability into the future of free exercise cases, it has
by no means made those cases predictable. Instead of having a
bright line rule like Smith to guide them, courts are now headed
down the case-by-case path of weighing the importance of the chal-
lenged law against the significance of certain religious practices. That
task might prove to be far more tedious than the courts expect.
That the President of the United States felt the need to overrule a
United States Supreme Court case relating to the protection of
religious exercise sends a message that undue interference with re-
ligious freedom will not be tolerated.
Allison J. Cornwell
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